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1

Introduction

Social choice theory studies methods of collective decision making, and their interplay with
social welfare and individual preference and behavior. Rigorous study of social choice dates
back to the 18’th century, when Condorcet discovered the following voting paradox: in a social
ranking of three alternatives that is determined by the majority vote, an ‘irrational’ circular
ranking may occur where a candidate A is preferred over a candidate B, B is preferred over
C, and C is preferred over A. Social choice theory in its modern form was established in
the 1950’s with the discovery of Arrow’s impossibility theorem [Arr50, Arr63], which showed
that all social ranking systems that satisfy a few reasonable conditions must either obtain
irrational circular outcomes, or be dictatorships (a dictatorship is a system where the ranking
is determined by just one voter).
Manipulations. Many of the results in the study of social choice are negative, showing that
certain desired properties of social choice schemes cannot be attained. One of the hallmark
examples of such theorems was proved by Gibbard and Satterthwaite [Gib73, Sat75]. Their
theorem considers a voting system where each of n voters rank q alternatives, and the winner
is determined according to some pre-defined social choice function f : Lnq → [q] of all the
voters’ rankings—here Lq denotes the set of total orderings of the q alternatives.
We say that a social choice function is manipulable, if a situation may occur where a voter
who knows the rankings given by other voters can change her own ranking in a way that does
not reflect her true preferences, but which leads to an outcome that is more desirable to her.
Formally
x

Definition 1.1 (Manipulation point). For a ranking x ∈ Lq , write a > b to denote that the
alternative a is preferred by x over b. A social choice function f : Lnq → [q] is manipulable at
x ∈ Lnq if there exist a y ∈ Lnq and i ∈ [n] such that x and y only differ in the i’th coordinate
and
xi
f (y) > f (x)
(1)
In this case we also say that x is a manipulation point of f , and that (x, y) is a manipulation
pair for f . We say that f is manipulable, if it is manipulable at some point x. We also say
that x is an r-manipulation point of f , if f has a manipulation pair (x, y) such that y is
obtained from x by permuting (at most) r adjacent alternatives in one of the coordinates of
x.
Gibbard and Satterthwaite proved that any social choice function which attains three or
more values, and whose outcome does not depend on just one voter, must be manipulable.
Theorem 1.2 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite [Gib73, Sat75]). Any social choice function f : Lnq →
[q] which takes at least three values and is not a dictator is manipulable.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has contributed significantly to the realization that
it is unlikely to expect truthfulness in the context of voting. In a way, this and other results
in social choice theory, contributed to the development of mechanism design, a field centered
around developing social mechanisms that obtain desirable results even when each member
of the society acts selfishly.
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Quantitative social choice. Theorem 1.2 is tight in the sense that monotone social choice
functions which are dictators or only have two possible outcomes are indeed non-manipulable
(a function is non-monotone, and clearly manipulable, if for some set of rankings a voter
can change the outcome from say a to b by moving a ahead of b in his preference). It is
interesting, however, to study manipulation quantitatively, asking not just whether a function
is manipulable but how many manipulations occur in it. To state results in quantitative social
choice we need to define the distance between social choice functions.
Definition 1.3 (Distance between social choice functions). The distance D(f, g) between two
social choice functions f, g : Lnq → [q] is defined as the fraction of inputs on which they differ:
D(f, g) = P[f (X) 6= g(X)], where X ∈ Lnq is uniformly selected. For a class G of social
functions, we write D(f, G) = ming∈G D(f, g).
We also define some classes of functions that may not have any manipulation points.
Definition 1.4. We use the following three classes of functions, defined for parameters n
and q that remain implicit (when used, the parameters will be obvious from the context):
CONST = {f : Lnq → [q] | f is constant }
DICTi = {f : Lnq → [q] | f only depend on the i:th coordinate } , for i ∈ [n]
DICT = ∪ni=1 DICTi
NONMANIP = {f : Lnq → [q] | f is either a dictator or takes at most two values}

1.1

Our results

Our results only apply to social choice functions which are neutral. A social choice function is
neutral if it is invariant under changes made to the names of the alternatives (see Definition 2.1
for a formal description). In our first main result we show the following lower bound on the
number of manipulation points in a neutral social function:
Theorem 1.5. Fix q ≥ 4 and let f : Lnq → [q] be a neutral social choice function with
D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ. Then,
P(f is manipulable at X) ≥

ǫ2
2n3 q 6 (q!)2

(2)

where X ∈ Lnq is selected uniformly.
Note that the result above directly implies the following:
Corollary 1.6. Fix q ≥ 4 and let f : Lnq → [q] be a neutral social choice function with
D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ. Then,
P((X, Y ) is a manipulable pair for f ) ≥

ǫ2
,
2n4 q 6 (q!)3

where X ∈ Lnq is selected uniformly, and Y is obtained from X by uniformly selecting a
coordinate i ∈ {1, .., n} and resetting the i’th coordinate to a random preference.
3

The result above has super exponential dependency on the number of alternatives q. A
more refined analysis yields the following theorem.
Theorem 1.7 (main theorem). Fix q ≥ 4 and let f : Lnq → [q] be a neutral social choice
function with D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ. Then,
P(f is manipulable at X) ≥ P(X is a 4-manipulation point of f ) ≥

ǫ2
104 n3 q 30

(3)

where X ∈ Lnq is uniformly selected.
A result similar to Theorem 1.7 was obtained for the case q = 3 in [FKN09], but the
result of [FKN09] counted manipulation pairs rather than manipulation points. Translating
the bound on the fraction of manipulation points in Theorem 1.7 directly to the case of pairs
deteriorates the lower bound, inserting a factor of q! in the denominator. However using the
stronger bound on the fraction of 4-manipulation points, a direct corollary lower bounds the
fraction of manipulation pairs of a certain kind while keeping the polynomial dependency on
q.
Corollary 1.8 (manipulation pairs). Fix q ≥ 4 and let f : Lnq → [q] be a neutral social choice
function with D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ. Then,
P((X, Y ) is a manipulation pair for f ) ≥

ǫ2
109 n4 q 34

(4)

where X ∈ Lnq is uniformly selected, and Y is obtained from X by uniformly selecting a
coordinate i ∈ {1, .., n}, then selecting 4 adjacent alternatives in Xi and randomly permuting
them.
The case of large q, solved here, was left as the main open problem in [FKN09]. Their main
motivation was that deriving quantitative versions of Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems with
polynomial dependency of q and n would indicate that from the computational complexity
point of view it is easy on average to find manipulation points. This point is discussed in
more detail in the related work subsection.
Our lower bound for the number of manipulation points deteriorates polynomially with the
number of voters, n, and the number q of alternatives. Some polynomial deterioration as
a function of n is necessary. This can be observed by considering the plurality function
pl : Lnq → [q], whose value is defined to be the candidate which is top ranked by the largest
number of voters (break ties by picking the candidate which is top ranked by the ’leftmost’
voter). It is easy to observe that a point where no ties are formed is not a manipulation point
of pl, and that for any fixed q the fraction of points that do contain ties is polynomially small
in n. As for the dependency on q—we do not know whether it is necessary.

1.2

History and related work

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem presented a difficulty in designing social choice functions,
namely that of strategic voting. A line of research aimed at overcoming these difficulties suggested constructions of social choice functions where it is computationally difficult for a voter
4

to find beneficial manipulation [BTT89, BO91, CS03, EL05]. However these constructions
considered worst case analysis—they did not rule out the possibility that on average, finding
a manipulation may be easy. Indeed, some results showed that finding manipulations is easy
on average for certain restricted classes of social choice functions [PR06, CS06, Kel93] (see
also the survey [FP10]).
Recently, a result of Friedgut, Kalai and Nisan [FKN09] provided a very general result,
showing that in the case of a neutral social choice function between 3 alternatives even
a random attempted manipulation is beneficial for a voter with non-negligible probability.
Adapted to our notation, the main result of [FKN09] can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1.9 ([FKN09]). There exists a constant C > 0 with the following property. Let
f : Ln3 → [3] be a neutral social choice function with D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ. Then,
P((X, Y ) is a manipulation pair for f ) ≥ C

ǫ2
n

(5)

where X ∈ Ln3 is uniformly selected, and Y is obtained from X by uniformly selecting a
coordinate i ∈ {1, .., n} and resetting the i’th coordinate to a random preference.
Choosing X, Y randomly as in Theorem 1.9, the result of [FKN09] implies that a manipulation pair is obtained with non-negligible probability (at most polynomially small in n),
and thus a manipulation pair can be found efficiently as long as f can be efficiently evaluated. Note however that the computational problem discussed above is different from the
problem considered in previous work [BO91, CS03, EL05, PR06, CS06], where the complexity
studied was that of finding a beneficial manipulation for a specific voter, given the declared
preferences of all other voters – since [FKN09] considers only three alternatives, a voter with
access to the social choice function can easily try all permutations of the alternatives to find
a manipulation.
Corollary 1.6 and Corollary 1.8, which extend the result of [FKN09] to the case of 4 or more
alternatives, are thus more relevant with respect to the hardness of finding a manipulation.
They imply that in the case were votes are cast uniformly at random, a random change
of preference for a random voter will yield a beneficial manipulation with non-negligible
probability–at most polynomially small in q and n by Corollary 1.8. Thus in the setup
of [BO91, CS03, EL05, PR06, CS06], with positive probability, a single voter with black-box
access to f can efficiently manipulate. This implies that approach of masking manipulations
behind computational hardness cannot hide manipulations completely.
We note that there are other (independent) extensions of [FKN09] for more candidates.
Xia and Conitzer [XC08] applied the proof strategy of [FKN09] to show that for some social
choice functions with n voters and a fixed number m of alternatives, starting with a uniformly
random voting profile and then randomly resetting the ranking of one of the voters yields a
manipulation pair with probability Ω(1/n). Their proof requires a number of properties of the
social choice functions including anonymity (the social choice outcome depends only on the
number of times each order was chosen), homogeneity (if each vote is replaced by t identical
votes the outcome remains the same), canceling out (this condition related to neutrality it says that one can cancel any subset of the votes which contains each order exactly once).
Most importantly the results of Xia and Conitzer require that certain outcomes are robust
5

(will not change if a small linear fraction of the voters cast a specific order) and the result does
not give bounds on the frequency of manipulations in terms of m, the number of alternatives.
The later point implies that the results do not have implications for the hardness of finding
a manipulation in the setup of [BO91, CS03, EL05, PR06, CS06].
We further note that Dobzinski and Procaccia [DP08] established an analogous result for
the case of two voters and any number of candidates, under a comparably weak assumption
on the voting rule.

1.3

Techniques

The result of [FKN09] are obtained by mixing combinatorial techniques with discrete harmonic analysis. In contrast, our techniques are purely geometric and combinatorial. In
particular, we apply a variant of the a canonical path method to prove isoperimetric bounds
of ”second order”. These allow to establish the existence of a large interface where 3 bodies
touch. As far as we know, our result is the first one to establish such a bound in any context.
The canonical path method. Before describing our techniques, we briefly recall the
canonical path method [JS90]. Given a graph G and a subset A of its vertices, a general
approach to proving a lower bound on the ’surface area’ of A—namely the number of vertices
in A that are attached by an edge to a vertex outside of A—is as follows: for each pair x, y
of vertices in G such that x ∈ A and y 6∈ A, determine a path in G between them, called the
canonical path between x and y. Since x is in A and y is not, there is at least one surface
vertex on each canonical path. So if one manages to prove that each surface vertex lies on at
Ā|
most r canonical paths, it immediately follows that the surface of A contains at least |A|·|
r
vertices, giving the required lower bound on the surface area of A.
Manipulation paths. Think of the graph G having the set Lnq of all ranking profiles as
the vertex set, where the pair (x, y) is an edge if x and y differ on at most one coordinate.
A social choice function f : Lnq → [q] naturally partitions the vertices of G into q subsets.
Our main interest is not in the surface area of these subsets, however, but in the number of
manipulation points.
Our approach in the proof of Theorem 1.5 is therefore the following: we consider four subsets f −1 (A), f −1 (B), f −1 (C) and f −1 (D), where the outcome is A, B, C and D respectively.
We first use elementary methods to show that many edges in our graph lie on the interface
between f −1 (A) and f −1 (B), namely have one vertex from each of the subsets. Similarly,
many edges must lie on the interface between f −1 (C) and f −1 (D).
We then define a so called manipulation path for each pair of edges consisting of one
edge on the interface between f −1 (A) and f −1 (B), and one on the interface between f −1 (C)
and f −1 (D). The path (of edges) has the property that it either stays in one interface or
the other. If a path ”transitions” from the interface between f −1 (A) and f −1 (B) and the
interface between f −1 (C) and f −1 (D) then around the transition point the function must
obtain at least 3 values. This realization allows us to apply the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem and associate a manipulation point with the path. Much of the work is then devoted
to bounding the number of paths that can correspond to each manipulation point.
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A refined geometry. To obtain the improved parameters of Theorem 1.7 we use a proof
scheme similar to that of Theorem 1.5, however we use an underlying graph with a different
edge structure. Instead of connecting every pair x, y ∈ Lnq of ranking profiles that differ in
just one coordinate, we connect x and y only if in the coordinate i in which they differ, yi
can be obtained from xi by a single transposition. In the case where n = 1 this is the graph
that’s studied in the analysis of the adjacent transposition card shuffling [Ald83, Wil04]. The
proof of the refined result requires to show that geometric and combinatorial quantities such
as boundaries and manipulation points are roughly the same in the refined graph as in the
original graph on Lnq . This proof requires the development of a number of techniques, in
particular the study of canonical paths under group actions.

1.4

Organization of the paper

In Section 2 we set some notations, definitions, and some general observations. We prove
Theorem 1.5 in Sections 3, 4 and 5. Theorem 1.7 is proved in Sections 6, 7, and 8. Finally,
some open problems appear in Section 9.

2

Setup and notation

Rankings. We denote by Lq the set of rankings of q alternatives. An element x ∈ Lq is a
permutation of the set [q]. The elements ranked at top by x is x(1), the second is x(2) etc.
Given another element y ∈ Lq , their composition yx is the ranking where the element ranked
at the top is y(x(1)) etc.
More generally we will also sometimes use LS to denote the set of rankings of a set S.
Definition 2.1 (neutral social choice functions). Let f : Lnq → [q] be a social choice function.
We say that f is neutral if for every x ∈ Lnq and every y ∈ Lq , y(f (x)) = f (yx1 , . . . , yxn ).
Informally f is neutral if the names of the alternatives do not matter when applying f .
Influences and Variance. We call a function f : Lnq → [q] a social choice function and
define the influence of the i:th coordinate on f as Inf i (f ) = P(f (X) 6= f (X (i) )) where X is
uniform on Lnq and X (i) is obtained from X by re-randomizing the i:th coordinate. Similarly
we define the influence of the i:th coordinate w.r.t. to a single alternative a ∈ [q] or a pair of
alternatives a, b ∈ [q] as
Inf ai (f ) = P(f (X) = a, f (X (i) ) 6= a)
and

(i)
Inf a,b
i (f ) = P(f (X) = a, f (X ) = b)

respectively.
P
We also define the total influence of f as Inf(f ) = ni=1 Inf i (f ). The following relationship
is obvious,
Proposition 2.2. For any f : Lnq → [q],
Inf i (f ) =

q
X

Inf ai (f ) =

a=1

X

a,b∈[q]:a6=b
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Inf a,b
i (f )

(6)

The following standard proposition bounds the total influence with respect to a given
candidate from below by the variance with respect to that candidate.
Proposition 2.3. For any f : Lnq → [q] and a ∈ [q],
n
X

Inf ai (f ) ≥ Var[1{f (X)=a} ]

(7)

i=1

where X ∈ Lnq is uniformly selected.
Proof. Create a random walk X = X (0) , . . . , X (n) = Y from X by re-randomizing the i:th
coordinate in the i:th step, i.e. for i ∈ [n], X (i) ∈ Lnq is obtained by re-randomizing the i:th
coordinate of X (i−1) . Letting g(x) = 1{f (x)=a} and using that X, Y are independent and that
if g(X) 6= g(Y ) then the value of g has to change at some edge on the path we have
2 Var[1{f (X)=a} ] = 2 Var g(X) = P(g(X) 6= g(Y )) ≤
≤ P(∪i∈[n] {g(X

(i−1)

(i)

) 6= g(X )}) ≤

n
X

2 Inf ai (f )

i=1

Further, if a function is far from all constants all such variances cannot be small:
Lemma 2.4. For any f : Lnq → [q],
q

qX
D(f, CONST) ≤
Var[1{f (X)=a} ]
2

(8)

a=1

Proof. For a ∈ [q], let µa = P(f (X) = a) and assume w.l.o.g. that µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ . . . ≥ µq .
Then,

q
D(f, CONST) = (1 − µ1 ) ≤ qµ1 (1 − µ1 ) =
1 − µ21 − (1 − µ1 )2 ≤
2
!
q
q
q
X
X
q
qX
q
2
2
µa =
1−
µa − µa =
Var[1{f (X)=a} ]
≤
2
2 a=1
2 a=1
a=1

3

Boundaries

Lemma 3.1. Fix q ≥ 3 and f : Lnq → [q] satisfying D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ. Then there exist
distinct i, j ∈ [n] and {a, b}, {c, d} ⊆ [q] such that c ∈
/ {a, b} and
Inf a,b
i (f ) ≥

2ǫ
2ǫ
and Inf c,d
j (f ) ≥
2
− 1)
nq (q − 1)

nq 2 (q

8

(9)

n
Proof. For a 6= b let Aa,b = i ∈ [n] | Inf a,b
i ≥

2ǫ

nq 2 (q−1)

o
.

We first claim that for all {a, b} there exists {c, d} such that {c, d} =
6 {a, b} and Ac,d =
6 ∅.
Note that f being ǫ-far from taking two values asserts that we can find a c ∈
/ {a, b} such that
ǫ
≥ qǫ . But then, by Proposition 2.3,
1 − qǫ ≥ P(f (X) = c) ≥ q−2
n
XX

Inf c,d
i (f ) =

d6=c i=1

n
X

Inf ci (f ) ≥ Var[1{f (X)=c} ] ≥

i=1

ǫ(1 − ǫ/q)
ǫ(q − 1)
≥
q
q2

hence there must exist some d 6= c and i ∈ [n] such that Inf c,d
i ≥

ǫ
nq 2

≥

2ǫ
,
nq 2 (q−1)

and thus

Ac,d

6 ∅.
=
We next claim that
| ∪a,b Aa,b | ≥ 2

(10)

To see this, assume the contrary, i.e. ∪a,b Aa,b ⊆ {i} for some i ∈ [n]. Then for all j =
6 i it
holds that
X c,d
2ǫ
ǫ
q(q − 1)
=
(11)
Inf j (f ) =
Inf j (f ) <
2
nq 2 (q − 1)
nq
c,d

For σ ∈ Lq , let fσ (x) = f (x1 , . . . , xi−1 , σ, xi+1 , . . . , xn ) and note that for j 6= i,
Inf j (f ) =

1 X
Inf j (fσ )
q!

(12)

σ∈Lq

while Inf i (fσ ) = 0. Hence, by (11), we have
ǫ>q

X
j6=i

n

2 X
q XX
D(fσ , CONST) = 2 D(f, DICTi )
Inf j (fσ ) ≥
Inf j (f ) =
q!
q! σ
σ
j=1

where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.4 and Proposition 2.3. But this means
that f is ǫ/2-close to a dictator, contradicting the assumption that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ.
Hence (10) holds. Therefore we can either find i 6= j and {a, b} =
6 {c, d} such that i ∈ Aa,b
c,d
a,b
and j ∈ A which proves the theorem, or we must have |A | ≥ 2 for some {a, b} while
Ac,d = ∅ for any {c, d} =
6 {a, b}. However, this contradicts the first claim in the proof. The
result follows.
As a simple corollary we have that assuming neutrality and q ≥ 4 we may assume a, b, c, d
are all distinct,
Corollary 3.2. Fix q ≥ 4 and suppose f : Lnq → [q] is neutral and satisfies D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ.
Then there exist distinct i, j ∈ [n] and distinct a, b, c, d ∈ [q] such that
Inf a,b
i (f ) ≥

ǫ
ǫ
and Inf c,d
j (f ) ≥
nq 2 (q − 1)
nq 2 (q − 1)

(13)

Proof. Neutrality of f implies that f is 1 − 2/q ≥ 1/2 far from the set of functions taking at
most 2 values. Since ǫ ≤ 1 it follows that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ/2 Moreover, by neutrality,
Inf a,b
i does not depend on {a, b} so we can choose {a, b} and {c, d} non-intersecting.
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4

First Construction of Manipulation Paths

Similar to the definition of influence, let us now define f ’s boundary in the i:th direction
w.r.t. the alternatives a, b ∈ [q] as
Bia,b (f ) = {(x, y) | f (x) = a, f (y) = b, ∀j 6= i : xj = yj }
The main idea of the proof is to define a canonical path between every pair of points on
Bia,b and every pair of points on Bjc,d in a way such that each canonical path passes through
a manipulation point while making sure that no manipulation point can be passed by too
many canonical paths. We call the paths so constructed manipulation paths.
Let us start with defining the canonical paths in terms of one voter. The main intuition
behind the canonical paths is that in order to remain on Bia,b we require that we change
rankings without changing the relative order of a and b. Similarly, in order to remain on Bjc,d
we require that we change the ranking without changing the relative order of c and d.
We now define the graph that we are working with:
Definition 4.1. The voting graph is the graph whose vertex set is Lnq and whose edges are
of the form x, y where xj = yj for all j 6= i and xi 6= yi .
We begin our definition of a canonical path by considering the case of one voter.
Definition 4.2. Fix q ≥ 4 and distinct a, b, c, d ∈ [q]. Then the canonical path between
x ∈ Lq and z ∈ Lq is x, y, z where y is obtained from z by swapping a and b if necessary in
order to assure that a and b are in the same order as in x. This first step is called a Type I
move while the second step from y to z is called a Type II move.
Note that Type I moves preserve the order of a and b while Type II moves preserve the
order of c and d. We can now define the manipulation paths used in the first proof. These
paths go from points in Bia,b to Bjc,d . To simplify notation we assume that i = n − 1 and
j = n. The path is of length 2n and is defined by first making all type I moves and then
making all type II moves.
a,b
and (z, z ′ ) ∈ Bnc,d , for distinct a, b, c, d ∈ [q].
Definition 4.3. Let f : Lnq → [q], (x, x′ ) ∈ Bn−1
Then the canonical path Γ between (x, x′ ) and (z, z ′ ) is

(x, x′ ) = (x(0) , x′(0) ), . . . , (x(n−2) , x′(n−2) ), (z (n−2) , z ′(n−2) ), . . . , (z (0) , z ′(0) ) = (z, z ′ ),
where only coordinate k is updated at the k:th first step and the k:th last step, i.e. for all k
and all s 6= k:
′(k)
(x(k−1)
, x′(k−1)
) = (x(k)
s
s
s , xs ),

and

(zs(k−1) , zs′(k−1) ) = (zs(k) , zs′(k) ),

(k)

,

zk

′(k)

,

zk

,

xk = zk

′(k−1)

,

xk

x′k = xk

′(k)

= zk

are the canonical paths in Definition 4.2.
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(k−1)

(k)

(k−1)

xk = xk

= zk

′(k−1)

= zk′

5

Manipulation Points and First Proof

Lemma 5.1. For any f : Lnq → [q], distinct i, j ∈ [n] and distinct a, b, c, d ∈ [q] there exists
a mapping h : Bia,b (f ) × Bjc,d (f ) → M where
M = {x ∈ Lnq | f is manipulable at x}
such that for any x ∈ M
|h−1 (x)| ≤ 2n(q!)n+4 .

(14)

Proof. Without loss of generality, let i = n−1 and j = n. Fix (x, x′ ) ∈ Bia,b and (z, z ′ ) ∈ Bjc,d .
Any edge on the canonical path between (x, x′ ) and (z, z ′ ) connects two pairs of points. The
left-most pair takes the values (a, b) since f (x) = a and f (x′ ) = b while the right-most
pair takes the values (c, d). We claim that somewhere on the path there will be an edge
(u, u′ ), (v, v ′ ) such that either
I. at least one of u, u′ , v, v ′ is a manipulation point.
II. f takes on at least three values on the points u, u′ , v, v ′ .
To see this note that at least one of three things must happen:
1. Somewhere along the first half of the path the values of the pair changes from (a, b)
to something else. If the first value changes to b then f (x(k) ) = a and f (x(k+1) ) = b,
but since the order of a, b are preserved under Type I moves either x(k) or x(k+1) must
be a manipulation point. A similar logic applies when the second value changes to a.
Otherwise, one of the values are not in {a, b} and therefore f takes on at least three
values on the two pairs of this edge.
2. Somewhere along the second half of the path - starting from the end - the values of the
pair changes from (c, d) to something else. If the first value changes to d or the second
value changes to c we have a manipulation point since the order of c, d are preserved
under Type II moves. Otherwise, one of the values are not in {c, d}.
3. The middle edge (x(n−2) , x′(n−2) ), (z (n−2) , z ′(n−2) ) connects a pair with values (a, b) and
a pair with values (c, d).
Let (u, u′ ), (v, v ′ ) be the first edge where one of I. or II. holds and note that u, u′ , v, v ′
agree in all but two coordinates, either {n − 1, k}, {n, k} or {n, n − 1} depending on whether
the edge (u, u′ ), (v, v ′ ) is on the first part of the path, the second part or is the middle edge.
We now claim that we can find a manipulation point y such that u, u′ , v, v ′ and y agree
in all but two coordinates. We will let h((x, x′ ), (z, z ′ )) be this y.
For case I. this is obvious and we can let y be the any of u, u′ , v, v which is a manipulation
point.
For case II., by applying the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Th. 1.2) on the restriction
of f to the two coordinates on which u, u′ , v, v ′ differ we can identify a manipulation point
y ∈ Lnq which only differ from u, u′ , v, v ′ on these two coordinates and also is a manipulation
11

point of the original function f (if there is more than one possible manipulation point we can
just pick say the lexicographically smallest one).
It remains to count the number of inverses of a manipulation point y associated with the
edge (u, u′ ), (v, v ′ ) which can be any of the 2n − 3 edges of the canonical path. Given the
edge number and y, there are only (q!)2 possibilities for u. Given u and the edge number
there are only (q!)n possibilities for x and z. To see this note that for each k ∈ [n] we must
have either
• uk = xk . In this case there are q! possibilities for zk .
• uk = zk . In this case there are q! possibilities for xk .
• xk , uk , zk is the canonical path from Definition 4.2 between xk and zk . Then there are
q!
2 possibilities for xk and 2 possibilities for zk .
Finally, given x and z there are at most (q!)2 possibilities for x′ and z ′ . Overall we have:
|h−1 (y)| ≤ (2n − 3)(q!)n+4

(15)

Proof of Theorem 1.5. By Corollary 3.2 we can find distinct i, j ∈ [n] and distinct a, b, c, d ∈
[q] such that
|Bia,b (f )| ≥

ǫ
ǫ
(q!)n+1 and |Bjc,d (f )| ≥ 2
(q!)n+1
nq 2 (q − 1)
nq (q − 1)

(16)

Applying Lemma 5.1 we see that
|M | ≥

|Bia,b (f ) × Bjc,d (f )|
2n(q!)n+4

≥

ǫ2
ǫ2
n
(q!)
≥
(q!)n
2n3 q 4 (q − 1)2 (q!)2
2n3 q 6 (q!)2

(17)

ǫ2
2n3 q 6 (q!)2

(18)

Hence,
P(f is manipulable at X) ≥

6

Canonical Paths and Group Actions

In order to derive the more refined result, we will need to consider in more detail the properties
of the permutation group Lq with respect to adjacent transpositions. Again we use canonical
paths arguments. We state the arguments in a more general setup.
Definition 6.1. Let L be a set.
• Let PL (ℓ) denote the set of paths of length at most ℓ in L and PL = ∪ℓ∈N PL (l) the set
of paths of finite length.
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• Let L1 , L2 ⊆ L. A canonical path map on L from L1 to L2 of length ℓ is a map
Γ : L1 × L2 → PL (ℓ) which satisfies that Γ(x, y) begins at x and ends at y for all
(x, y) ∈ L1 × L2 .
• Given a canonical path map Γ : L1 × L2 → PL (ℓ) and 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ we define the inverse
L1 ×L2 as
image mapping of the i’th vertex, Γ−1
i :L→2
Γ−1
i (z) = {(x, y) | length(Γ(x, y)) ≥ i, Γ(x, y)i = z}.
Further, we let
Γ−1 (z) = ∪ℓi=0 Γ−1
i (z)
• Given a group H acting on L we say that a canonical path map Γ : L1 × L2 → PL (ℓ) is
H-invariant if HL1 = L1 and HL2 = L2 and
Γ(hx, hy) = hΓ(x, y),
for all h ∈ H and all (x, y) ∈ L1 × L2 .
We will use the following proposition. Recall that a group H acting on L is called fixedpoint-free if for all x ∈ L and all h ∈ H different than the identity it holds that hx 6= x.
Proposition 6.2. Let H be a fixed-point-free group acting on L and let Γ : L1 × L2 → PL (ℓ)
be a canonical path map that is H-invariant. Then for all z ∈ L and 0 ≤ i ≤ l it holds that
|L1 ||L2 |
|H|

(19)

(ℓ + 1)|L1 ||L2 |
|H|

(20)

|Γ−1
i (z)| ≤
and
|Γ−1 (z)| ≤
Proof. Note that for all i,
|L1 × L2 | ≥

X

|Γ−1
i (w)| =

w

X

−1
|Γ−1
i (hz)| = |H||Γi (z)|,

h∈H

where the first inequality follows since the value of the i’th vertex partitions the set of paths
of length at least i, the first equality since H is fixed-point-free, and the final equality from
the path being H-invariant. We thus obtain:
|Γ

−1

(z)| ≤

ℓ
X

|Γ−1
i (z)| ≤

i=0

(ℓ + 1)|L1 ||L2 |
,
|H|

as needed.
Two applications of the result above will be given for adjacent transpositions.
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Definition 6.3. Given two elements a, b ∈ [q] the adjacent transposition [a : b] between them
is defined as follows. If x ∈ Lq has a and b adjacent, then [a : b]x is obtained from x be
exchanging a and b. Otherwise, [a : b]x = x.
We let T denote the set of all q(q − 1)/2 adjacent transpositions. Given z ∈ T , we define
Inf a,b;z
(f ) = P(f (X) = a, f (X (i) ) = b)
i

(21)

Inf a;z
i (f )
Inf a,b;T
(f )
i

(22)

(i)

= P(f (X) = a, f (X ) 6= a)
X a,b;z
=
Inf i (f )

(23)

z∈T

where X (i) is obtained from X by re-randomizing the i:th coordinate Xi in the following way:
with probability 1/2 we keep it as Xi and otherwise we replace it by zXi .
Finally for x ∈ Lnq we will let [a : b]i x denote the element obtained by applying [a : b] on
the i:th coordinate of x while leaving all other coordinates unchanged.
Proposition 6.4. There exists a canonical path map Γ : Lq × Lq → PLq (ℓ) of length at most
ℓ = q(q − 1)/2 < q 2 /2, all of whose edges are adjacent transpositions such that for all z it
holds that:
q 2 q!
(24)
|Γ−1 (z)| ≤
2
Proof. Given x, y ∈ Lq consider the following canonical path starting at x and ending at y.
Take the element y(1) ranked at the top for y and bubble it to the top by performing adjacent
transpositions. Then take the element y(2) ranked second for y and bubble it to the second
position etc. Clearly the length of the path is at most q(q − 1)/2. Let H = {x 7→ px | p ∈ Lq }
be the group of compositions with all possible permutations of the candidates. Since H is a
fixed-point-free group acting on Lq and the described canonical path map is H-invariant the
result follows from Proposition 6.2.
Corollary 6.5. For any f : Lnq → [q], a ∈ [q] and i ∈ [n] it holds that
X

Inf a;z
i (f ) ≥

z∈T

1
Inf ai (f ),
q2

(25)

where T is the set of all adjacent transpositions.
Proof. This is a standard canonical path argument. Since both sides of the desired inequality
involve averaging over all coordinates but the i’th coordinate, it follows that it suffices to
prove the claim in the case where i = n = 1. Let B = {(u, v) ∈ Lq × Lq | f (u) = a 6=
f (v), ∃z ∈ T : v = zu} and note that
X

Inf a;z
1 (f ) =

z∈T

|B|
,
2q!

(26)

Consider the canonical path map Γ constructed in Proposition 6.4. Note that each canonical
path between an element in A := {x ∈ Lq | f (x) = a} and an element in Ac must pass via
14

one of the edges in B. Define h : A × AC → B by letting h(x, y) be the first edge in B which
Γ(x, y) passes through. Then by (24), for any (u, v) ∈ B,
|h−1 ((u, v))| ≤ |Γ−1 (u)| ≤
Thus
|B| ≥

q 2 q!
2

|A||Ac |
q 2 q!/2

(27)

(28)

Combining (26) and (28) we obtain:
X

Inf a;z
1 (f ) ≥

z∈T

1 |A| |Ac |
1
1 |A||Ac |
=
= 2 Inf a1 (f )
2
2
2q! q q!/2
q q! q!
q

A second application of Proposition 6.4 is the following.
Proposition 6.6. Fix two elements a, b ∈ [q] and let B ⊆ Lq denote the set of all permutations where a is ranked above b. Then there exists a canonical path map Γ : B × B → PB (q 2 )
consisting of adjacent transpositions such that all permutations along the path satisfy that a
is ranked above b. Moreover for all z it holds that:
|Γ−1 (z)| ≤ q 4 q!
Proof. Γ(x, y) is defined as follows. We look at all elements different than a, b, starting with
the top one of y, and bubble each of them upwards to its position in y ignoring a, b. After
we have done so, we have all elements but a, b ordered as in y, followed by a, followed by b.
We now bubble a to its location in y and then bubble b. Note that the length of the path so
defined is at most
(q + 4)(q − 1)
q(q − 1)
+ 2(q − 1) =
< q2
2
2
The proof now follows from Proposition 6.2 by considering the group H which acts by permuting arbitrary all elements but those labeled by a and b:
|Γ−1 (z)| ≤

7

q 2 (q!/2)2
q 2 |B|2
=
≤ q 4 q!
|H|
(q − 2)!

Refined Boundaries

Similarly to the previous construction we now define the i:th a-b boundary with respect to
an adjacent swap z ∈ T as
Bia,b;z (f ) = {(x, y) | f (x) = a, f (y) = b, xi = zyi , ∀j 6= i : xj = yj },
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and the boundary with respect to arbitrary adjacent swaps on the i:th coordinate as
[ a,b;z
Bia,b;T (f ) =
Bi (f )
z∈T

Note that for a 6= b,
(f ) =
Inf a,b;z
i

7.1

1
1 |Bia,b;z (f )|
P(f (X) = a, f (zX) = b) =
2
2 (q!)n

(29)

Manipulation points on refined boundaries

The following two lemmas identify manipulation points on these boundaries.
Lemma 7.1. Fix f : Lnq → [q], distinct a, b ∈ [q] and (x, y) ∈ Bia,b;T . Then either xi = [a : b]yi
or one of x and y is a 2-manipulation point for f .
Proof. Suppose xi = [c : d]yi where {c, d} =
6 {a, b}. Then an adjacent transposition of c
xi

yi

and d will not change the order of a and b. Hence b > a iff b > a. But then either i)
yi

xi

f (y) = b > a = f (x) and x is a 2-manipulation point or ii) f (x) = a > b = f (y) and y is a
2-manipulation point.
Lemma 7.2. Fix f : Lnq → [q] and points x, y, z ∈ Lnq such that (x, y) ∈ Bia,b;T (z, y) ∈ Bjc,b;T
where a, b, c are distinct and i 6= j. Then there exists a 3 - manipulation point w ∈ Lnq for f
such that wk = yk for k ∈
/ {i, j} and wi is equal to xi or yi except that the position of c may
be shifted arbitrarily and wj is equal to zj or yj except that the position of a may be shifted
arbitrarily.
Proof. By Lemma 7.1 we must have xi = [a : b]yi and zj = [c : b]yj , or x, y or z is a
2-manipulation point in which case we are done.
Now create a new triple (x′ , y ′ , z ′ ) by starting from (x, y, z) and simultaneously in the
i:th coordinate of x, y and z, bubbling c towards the pair ab until it becomes adjacent to the
pair. Since c is never swapped with a or b during this process Lemma 7.1 implies that for
any intermediate triple (e
x, ye, ze) we have f (e
x) = a, f (e
y ) = b and f (e
z) ∈
/ {a, b}, or one of x
e, ye
and ze is a 2-manipulation point. But since we also have ze = [c : b]j ye, we must actually have
f (e
z ) = c, or either ye or ze is a 2-manipulation point.
Similarly bubbling a towards the pair bc in coordinate j starting from (x′ , y ′ , z ′ ) gives
a,b;[a:b]
us x′′ , y ′′ , z ′′ all having a, b, c adjacent in coordinates i and j such that (x′′ , y ′′ ) ∈ Bi
c,b;[c:b]
and (z ′′ , y ′′ ) ∈ Bj
. Note that x′′ , y ′′ , z ′′ are equal except for a reordering of the blocks
containing a, b, c in coordinates i and j.
Now arbitrary adjacent swapping of a, b, c in these coordinates of x′′ , y ′′ and z ′′ will keep
the value of f in {a, b, c}, or give rise to a 2-manipulation point by Lemma 7.1. Thus we
can define a social choice function with 2 voters and 3 candidates f ′ : L2{a,b,c} → {a, b, c} by
letting f ′ (v) = f (g(v)), where g(v) ∈ Lnq is obtained from x′′ by simply reordering the two
blocks of elements a, b, c in coordinates i and j to match v1 and v2 , respectively. Since f ′ takes
three values and is not a dictator, Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Theorem 1.2) implies that f ′ has a
manipulation point and hence f has a 3-manipulation point satisfying our requirements.
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7.2

Large Refined Boundaries

Now we possess the right tools to prove the analogue of Lemma 3.1 for refined boundaries.
Lemma 7.3. Fix q ≥ 3 and f : Lnq → [q] satisfying D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ. Let X be
uniformly selected from Lnq . Then either,
P(f is 2-manipulable at X) ≥

4ǫ
nq 7

(30)

or there exist distinct i, j ∈ [n] and {a, b}, {c, d} ⊆ [q] such that c ∈
/ {a, b} and
a,b;[a:b]

Inf i

(f ) ≥

Proof. First, suppose that Inf a,b;z
≥
i
(x, x′ )

2ǫ
nq 7

2ǫ
2ǫ
c,d;[c:d]
and Inf j
(f ) ≥ 7 ,
7
nq
nq

(31)

for some i, a 6= b and z 6= [a : b]. Then by Lemma 7.1

Bia,b;z (f )

for any point
∈
at least one of x or x′ = zx is a 2-manipulation point. Let
f be the set of all such 2-manipulation points. Then
M
f| ≥ |B a,b;z (f )| = 2(q!)n Inf a,b;z (f ) ≥
|M
i
i

4ǫ
(q!)n
nq 7

(32)

Dividing with (q!)n gives (30). Thus, for the remainder of the proof we may assume that
<
Inf a,b;z
i

2ǫ
nq 7

,

∀i ∈ [n], {a, b} ⊆ [q], z 6= [a : b]

n
a,b;[a:b]
Now, for a 6= b let Aa,b = i ∈ [n] | Inf i
≥

2ǫ
nq 7

o

(33)

.

We first claim that for all {a, b} there exists {c, d} such that {c, d} =
6 {a, b} and Ac,d =
6 ∅.
Note that f being ǫ-far from taking two values asserts that we can find a c ∈
/ {a, b} such that
ǫ
≥ qǫ . But then, by Corollary 6.5 and Proposition 2.3,
1 − qǫ ≥ P(f (X) = c) ≥ q−2
n
X XX

Inf ic,d;w (f ) =

w∈T d6=c i=1

n
XX

Inf c;w
i (f ) ≥

w∈T i=1

ǫ(q − 1)
1
Var[1{f (X)=c} ] ≥
q2
q4

≥
hence there must exist some w ∈ T , d 6= c and i ∈ [n] such that Inf c,d;w
i
c,d
we must have w = [c : d], hence A 6= ∅.
We next claim that
| ∪a,b Aa,b | ≥ 2

ǫ
.
nq 6

But by (33)

(34)

To see this, assume the contrary, i.e. ∪a,b Aa,b ⊆ {i} for some i ∈ [n]. Then, by Corollary 6.5,
for all j 6= i it holds that
Inf j (f ) ≤ q 2

XX

z∈T

a

2
Inf a;z
j (f ) = q

X

z∈T,a,b>a
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Inf a,b;z
(f ) ≤
j

ǫ
q 6 2ǫ
=
7
2 nq
nq

(35)

For σ ∈ Lq , let fσ (x) = f (x1 , . . . , xi−1 , σ, xi+1 , . . . , xn ) and note that for j 6= i,
Inf j (f ) =

1 X
Inf j (fσ )
q!

(36)

σ∈Lq

while Inf i (fσ ) = 0. Hence, by (35), we have
ǫ≥q

X
j6=i

n

2 X
q XX
D(fσ , CONST) = 2 D(f, DICTi )
Inf j (fσ ) ≥
Inf j (f ) =
q!
q! σ
σ
j=1

where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.4 and Proposition 2.3. But this means
that f is ǫ/2-close to a dictator, contradicting the assumption that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ.
Hence (34) holds. Therefore we can either find i 6= j and {a, b} =
6 {c, d} such that i ∈ Aa,b
and j ∈ Ac,d which proves the theorem, or we must have |Aa,b | ≥ 2 for some {a, b} while
Ac,d = ∅ for any {c, d} =
6 {a, b}. However, this contradicts the first claim in the proof. The
result follows.
As a corollary we have that assuming neutrality and q ≥ 4 we may assume a, b, c, d are
all distinct,
Corollary 7.4. Fix q ≥ 4 and suppose f : Lnq → [q] is neutral and satisfies D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ.
Let X be uniformly selected from Lnq . Then either,
P(f is 2-manipulable at X) ≥

2ǫ
nq 7

(37)

or there exist distinct i, j ∈ [n] and distinct a, b, c, d ∈ [q] such that
a,b;[a:b]

Inf i

(f ) ≥

ǫ
ǫ
c,d;[c:d]
and Inf j
(f ) ≥ 7 ,
nq 7
nq

(38)

Proof. Neutrality of f implies that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ/2 and that Inf a,b
i does not depend
on {a, b} so we can choose {a, b} and {c, d} non-intersecting.
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Refined Construction of Manipulation Paths

We now present the second construction of manipulation paths. In this construction edges
along the path will consist of adjacent transpositions instead of general permutations as in
the previous construction. Again we construct manipulation paths between every edge on
a,b;[a:b]
c,d;[c:d]
Bi
and every edge on Bj
in a way such that each canonical path passes through
(or “close” to) a manipulation point while making sure that no manipulation point can be
passed by too many canonical paths. We call the paths so constructed refined manipulation
paths. The main goal in the current construction compared to the previous one is to have
better dependency on q, i.e. the number of inverse images of each manipulation point should
be poly(n)poly(q)q! instead of 2n(q!)4 q! as in the previous construction.
Let us first give two canonical paths on single coordinates that will be used as building
blocks when constructing the refined canonical paths:
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Proposition 8.1. Fix four elements a, b, c, d ∈ [q]. Then there exists a canonical path map
Γ : Lq × Lq → PLq (q 2 + 2q) with the following properties:
• Γ is a concatenation of two paths I and Π.
• The edges in I are arbitrary adjacent transpositions except [a : b], thus keeping the order
of a and b fixed.
• The edges in Π are arbitrary adjacent transpositions except [c : d], thus keeping the
order of c and d fixed.
• For every y ∈ Lq there are exactly q! pairs (x, z) ∈ Lq × Lq for which the last vertex of
I (first vertex of Π) in the path Γ(x, z) is equal to y.
4
• For all y ∈ Lq and i ≥ 0 we have |Γ−1
i (y)| ≤ q q!

Proof. First fix x, z ∈ Lq . If the order of c and d is the same in x and z then I has zero edges
and consists only of the point x. Otherwise, I swaps the positions of c and d by first bubbling
c to the position of d and then bubbling d back to the original position of c. Π is constructed
as in Proposition 6.6 while preserving the order of c and d.
Note that the length of I and Π is at most 2q − 2 and q 2 respectively. Further, fixing
the last point of I to y, there are two possibilities for x and q!/2 possibilities for z. Hence,
exactly q! possible values for (x, z).
Finally, by considering the group H which acts by permuting arbitrary all elements but
those labeled by a, b, c and d and noting that |H| = (q − 4)! it follows from Proposition 6.2
that
(q!)2
≤ q 4 q!
(39)
(y)|
≤
|Γ−1
i
(q − 4)!

Proposition 8.2. Fix four elements a, b, c, d ∈ [q]. Let
X = {x ∈ Lq | a, b are adjacent in x},
Then there exists a canonical path map Γ : X×Lq → PLq (q 2 +2q) with the following properties:
• Γ is a concatenation of three paths I, ∆ and Π.
• All edges in I are adjacent transpositions not involving a and b, thus keeping the rank
of a and b fixed.
• The edges in Π are arbitrary adjacent transpositions except [c : d], thus keeping the
order of c and d fixed.
• ∆ consists of a single edge which is a reordering of a block of exactly the 4 elements
a, b, c, d.
• For every y ∈ Lq there are at most 2q 3 q! pairs (x, z) ∈ Lq × Lq for which the last vertex
of I in the path Γ(x, z) is equal to y. The same holds for the first vertex of Π.
19

3
• For all y ∈ Lq and i ≥ 0 we have |Γ−1
i (y)| ≤ 2q q!

Proof. Fix x ∈ X and z ∈ Lq . The path I is constructed by first bubbling the element c
towards the block ab until it is adjacent to this block and then doing the same with d.
∆ consists of a single edge which reorders the block of a, b, c and d so that the order
matches that in z.
Π is constructed as in Proposition 6.6 while preserving the order of c and d.
Note that the length of I and Π is at most 2q − 1 and q 2 respectively.
Finally, by considering the group H which acts by permuting arbitrary all elements but
those labeled by a, b, c and d it follows follows from Proposition 6.2 that
|Γ−1
i (y)| ≤

2(q − 1)!q!
|X||Lq |
≤
≤ 2q 3 q!
|H|
(q − 4)!

(40)

The other properties are easy to verify.
a,b;[a:b]

c,d;[c:d]

We are now ready to define the canonical path from Bi
(f ) to Bj
(f ). This path
2
n
is over (Lq ) . If we only consider the first element of each such pair, then the path can
informally be described as being constructed by concatenating three paths I, ∆ and Π where
I is constructed by updating one coordinate at a time, using the path I of Proposition 8.1
for each coordinate k ∈
/ {i, j}, using the path I from Proposition 8.2 for coordinate i and
finally for coordinate j using the reverse of the path Π of Proposition 8.2 where the role of
elements a, b have been interchanged with that of c, d. The path ∆ do the middle step from
Proposition 8.1 for both i and j. The path Π then updates each coordinate again using the
remaining part of each path above.
Proposition 8.3. Fix four distinct elements a, b, c, d ∈ [q] and distinct i, j ∈ [n]. Let
X = {(x, x′ ) ∈ (Lnq )2 | x′ = [a : b]i x , x′ 6= x}
and
Z = {(z, z ′ ) ∈ (Lnq )2 | z ′ = [c : d]j z , z ′ 6= z}
Then there exists a canonical path map Γ : X × Z → P(Lnq )2 (2n(q 2 + 2)) with the following
properties:
• Γ is a concatenation of three paths I, ∆ and Π.
• I stays in X and for all edges ((v, v ′ ), (w, w′ )) in I both (v, w) and (v ′ , w′ ) consist of
single adjacent transpositions that preserve the order of a and b in each coordinate and
keep the rank of a and b fixed in coordinate i.
• Π stays in Z and for all edges ((v, v ′ ), (w, w′ )) in Π both (v, w) and (v ′ , w′ ) consist of
single adjacent transpositions that preserve the order of c and d in each coordinate and
keep the rank of c and d fixed in coordinate j.
• ∆ consists of a single edge ((v, v ′ ), (w, w′ )) such that v, v ′ , w, w′ are all equal up to a
reordering of a block of elements a, b, c, d in coordinates i and j.
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• For any (v, v ′ ) ∈ (Lnq )2 we have |Γ

−1

((v, v ′ ))| ≤ 7nq 12 (q!)n

Proof. To define Γ fix a starting pair (x, x′ ) ∈ X and an ending pair (z, z ′ ) ∈ Z. For this
pair, the paths I and Π are both constructed as a concatenation of n paths:
I = I(1), . . . , I(n) and Π = Π(1), . . . , Π(n)

(41)

In order to define these paths first note that since I must stay in X, every vertex (v, v ′ ) in
I must satisfy v ′ = [a : b]i v. Thus it is enough to describe the projection of I to the first
coordinate of each pair. Let I be this projection (so that if the j’th vertex of I is (v, v ′ ), then
the j’th vertex of I is v). Similarily since Π must stay in Z, every vertex (v, v ′ ) in Π satisfies
v ′ = [c : d]j v and it is enough to describe Π - the projection of Π to the first coordinate of
each pair.
Now, for any path Γ = (u(0), . . . , u(ℓ)) ∈ PLnq let Γk = (uk (0), . . . , uk (ℓ)) denote its
restriction to coordinate k. The projections I and Π can then be defined as follows,
• For any k = 1, . . . , n−1 the last vertex of I(k) is equal to the first vertex of I(k + 1),
and the last vertex of Π(k) is equal to the first vertex of Π(k + 1).
• ∀k, m 6= k : Im (k) and Πm (k) are constant paths, i.e. I(k) and Π(k) only change in
coordinate k.
• ∀k ∈
/ {i, j} : Ik (k) and Πk (k) are the paths I and Π making up Γ(xk , zk ) in Proposition 8.1.
• Ii (i) and Πi (i) are the paths I and Π making up Γ(xi , zi ) in Proposition 8.2.
• Ij (j) and Πj (j) are, respectively, the reverse of the paths Π and I making up Γ(zj , xj )
in Proposition 8.2 with the role of (a, b) there swapped with that of (c, d).
Note that this uniquely determines ∆ as the single edge from the last vertex of I to the first
vertex of Π. The three statements about the edges of Γ now follow from Proposition 8.1
and 8.2.
−1
Finally, to compute |Γ ((v, v ′ ))| for (v, v ′ ) ∈ (Lnq )2 we need to count the number of
−1

(x, x′ ) ∈ X and (z, z ′ ) ∈ Z such that (v, v ′ ) is a vertex on the path. Note that |Γ ((v, v ′ ))| =
0 unless (v, v ′ ) ∈ X or (v, v ′ ) ∈ Z. Without loss of generality assume that (v, v ′ ) ∈ X (the
argument for (v, v ′ ) ∈ Z is symmetric).
Then v could belong to any of the n paths I(1), . . . , I(n). Suppose it belongs I(m). No
matter what m is, v can be any of at most q 2 + 2q + 1 vertices on the path I(m). If m ∈
/ {i, j}
then by Proposition 8.1 there can be at most q 4 q! possibilities for (xm , zm ), and if m ∈ {i, j}
then by Proposition 8.2 there can be at most 2q 3 q! < q 4 q! possibilities for (xm , zm ). For all
other coordinates k 6= m we have that vk equals either xk or the last vertex of I(k). In both
cases there are by Proposition 8.2 at most 2q 3 q! possibilities for (xk , zk ) if k ∈ {i, j}, and by
/ {i, j} and Finally, since (x, x′ ) ∈ X
Proposition 8.1 exactly q! possibilities for (xk , zk ) if k ∈
′
′
and (z, z ) ∈ Y there is at most one possibility for x and z ′ given x and z. Hence we have,
|Γ

−1

((v, v ′ ))| ≤ n(q 2 + 2q + 1)q 4 q!(2q 3 q!)2 (q!)n−3 ≤ 7nq 12 (q!)n

since q ≥ 4.
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(42)

8.1

Proof of Theorem 1.7

Our main claim is the following
Lemma 8.4. For any f : Lnq → [q], distinct i, j ∈ [n] and distinct a, b, c, d ∈ [q] there exists
a,b;[a:b]

a mapping h : Bi

c,d;[c:d]

(f ) × Bj

(f ) → M where

M = {x ∈ Lnq | f is 4-manipulable at x}
such that for any x ∈ M
|h−1 (x)| ≤ 104 nq 16 (q!)n
a,b;[a:b]

(43)

c,d;[c:d]

Proof. Fix (x, x′ ) ∈ Bi
(f ) and (z, z ′ ) ∈ Bi
(f ). Then there exist a refined canonical
′
′
path Γ = Γ((x, x ), (z, z )) (being a concatenation of three paths I, ∆ and Π) satisfying the
properties of Proposition 8.3. We now claim the following:
Claim: Somewhere on this path there will be a vertex (v, v ′ ) such that v is close to a
4-manipulation point y, in the sense that it differs from y in at most 2 coordinates, and in
each of those two coordinates it only differs by a reordering of the elements a, b, c and d and
an arbitrary shifting of a single element in [q].
We will take h((x, x′ ), (z, z ′ )) to be an arbitrary 4-manipulation point y satisfying the
closeness requirement in the claim for some vertex on the path.
Now note that along this path at least one of the following three things must happen:
1. Somewhere along the first part I of the path there is an edge ((v, v ′ ), (w, w′ )) such that
(f (v), f (v ′ )) = (a, b) but (f (w), f (w′ )) 6= (a, b).
2. Somewhere along the second part Π of the path there is an edge ((v, v ′ ), (w, w′ )) such
that (f (v), f (v ′ )) 6= (c, d) but (f (w), f (w′ )) = (c, d).
3. Let ((v, v ′ ), (w, w′ )) be the single edge in ∆. Then (f (v), f (v ′ )) = (a, b) and (f (w), f (w′ )) =
(c, d).
We argue that the claim follows in each of these cases:
1. If e := f (w) 6= a, Lemma 7.1 implies that w = [a : e]k v for some k ∈ [n] (else v or w is
a 2-manipulation point, yielding the claim). Since the order of a and b is preserved in
all coordinates in I we must have e 6= b. Further k 6= i, since the rank of a is preserved
in coordinate i in this part of the path. Thus (v, v ′ ) ∈ Bia,b;T and (v, w) ∈ Bka,e;T and
Lemma 7.2 implies that there is a 3-manipulation point y which only differ from v, v ′ , w
and w′ in coordinates i and k. Furthermore, yk is equal to vk or wk except that the
position of b may have been shifted arbitrarily, and yi is equal to vi = wi or vi′ = wi′
except that the position of e may have been shifted arbitrarily. Thus it is either close
to v or w, in the sense of the claim.
The other possibility is that e := f (w′ ) 6= b, for which the claim follows by an analogous
argument (remembering that v and v ′ only differ by an adjacent swap of a, b).
2. The claim again follows analogously to the previous case.
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3. In this case Proposition 8.3 guarantees that v, v ′ , w, w′ only differ by a reordering of
adjacent blocks of elements a, b, c, d in coordinates i and j. Thus we may define a
new social choice function f ′ : L2{a,b,c,d} → {a, b, c, d} by letting f ′ (u) = f (g(u)) where
g(u) ∈ Lnq is obtained from v by simply reordering the two blocks of elements a, b, c, d
in coordinates i and j so that they match u1 and u2 respectively. Note that this
reordering can be done using adjacent transpositions involving a, b, c and d only. Hence
by Lemma 7.1, ∀u : f (g(u)) ∈ {a, b, c, d}, or else one of the intermediate points under
this reordering using adjacent transpositions must be a 2-manipulation point, yielding
the claim.
So we may assume that f ′ is well-defined, i.e. takes values in {a, b, c, d}. However
since f ′ takes on all four values and is not a dictator, Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Theorem 1.2) implies that f ′ must have a manipulation point u but then g(u) must be a
4-manipulation point of f , proving the claim.
Now fix y ∈ M . In order to count |h−1 (y)| note that there can be at most (4!q 2 )2 values
of v satisfying the closeness requirement to y given in the claim. Given v there are only 2
possibilities for the vertex (v, v ′ ) (depending on whether the vertex is in I or in Π). Further,
by Proposition 8.3 their can be at most 7nq 12 (q!)n canonical paths containing any specific
vertex. Thus,
|h−1 (y)| ≤ 2(4!q 2 )2 7nq 12 (q!)n ≤ 104 nq 16 (q!)n
(44)

Proof of Theorem 1.7. By Corollary 7.4, either we are done or we can find distinct i, j ∈ [n]
and distinct a, b, c, d ∈ [q] such that, by (29),
a,b;[a:b]

|Bi

(f )| ≥

2ǫ
2ǫ
c,d;[c:d]
(q!)n and |Bj
(f )| ≥ 7 (q!)n
7
nq
nq

(45)

Let M = {x ∈ Lnq | f is 4-manipulable at x}. Applying Lemma 8.4 we see that
a,b;[a:b]

|M | ≥

|Bi

c,d;[c:d]

(f ) × Bj

104 nq 16 (q!)n

(f )|

≥

Hence,
P(f is 4-manipulable at X) ≥

9

4ǫ2
104 n3 q 30
ǫ2
104 n3 q 30

(q!)n

(46)

(47)

Open problems

We list a few natural open problems that arise from our work.
• In Corollary 1.8 we prove that a random pair x, y is a manipulation point with nonnegligible probability, if y is obtained from x by a random change in 4 adjacent alternatives, applied to a random coordinate. For the case where y is obtained from x by
23

simply re-randomizing one of the coordinates, which is the one considered in [FKN09],
we only have a lower bound where q! appears in the denominator (see Corollary 1.6).
It would be interesting to prove a polynomial lower bound in the latter case.
• As is often the case with arguments involving canonical paths, we suspect that the
parameters we obtained are not tight. It would be interesting to find the correct tight
bounds. In particular, we are not even sure that the lower bound on the number of
manipulation points must decrease with q—the correct bound may even increase as a
function of q for neutral functions.
• Our results, as well as those of [FKN09], apply only to neutral functions. Can one prove
a quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for non-neutral functions?
• It would also be interesting to consider the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem quantitatively for non-uniform distributions over preferences.
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